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STRATEGIC STABILITY IN EUROPE
Risks with Low Numbers of US and Russian
Nuclear Weapons
David S. Yost
This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation
with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals
to ‘‘low numbers’’ (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might
include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended
deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to
Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing ‘‘launch-on-
warning’’ strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US
disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions
and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four
possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear
weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness
means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military
capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies
that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in
its deterrence and defense posture.
KEYWORDS: United States; Russia; NATO; deterrence; nuclear disarmament; nuclear
weapons; New START; strategic stability
This article examines the possible implications for strategic stability in Europe of low
numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons. The introduction considers the prospects for
such low numbers, offers definitions of key terms, and reviews briefly the importance
attributed to the US nuclear deterrence posture for strategic stability in Europe since 1949.
The next section presents a baseline of current nuclear capabilities in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with due attention to the nuclear forces of France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, including the US weapons deployed in Europe
under the alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements.
The article then offers a review of some of the risks that might arise for strategic
stability in and beyond Europe with reductions to low numbers, including the possibility of
US anti-cities strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed
European anxiety about a potential US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability
to Russian cheating, noncompliance, and breakout; incentives to adopt destabilizing
Nonproliferation Review, 2013
Vol. 20, No. 2, 205245, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2013.804317
# 2013 Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
‘‘first strike,’’ ‘‘preemption,’’ or ‘‘launch-on-warning’’ strategies; and controversial pressures
on the UK and French nuclear forces.1
This is followed by an examination of possible mechanisms beyond consultations to
address these risks, including sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in
Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; an ability to rapidly to
reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military
capabilities.
The article concludes that low numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons could
affect strategic stability in Europe in fundamental ways, even though the key factors
shaping strategic stability are ultimately political. If reductions to low numbers diminished
allied confidence in the United States as a reliable and responsible security guarantor, this
could have profoundly destabilizing effects within and beyond Europe.
Setting the Scene
The possibility that the United States might seek reductions to significantly lower numbers
of nuclear weapons than those specified in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(New START) has been raised in various recent documents. First, the January 2012 defense
guidance stated that, ‘‘It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller
nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well
as their role in US national security strategy.’’2 (Emphasis in original.) Second, according to
a February 2012 Associated Press report, the Department of Defense is analyzing the
implications of reductions to the ranges of 1,000 to 1,100, 700 to 800, or 300 to 400 total
weapons each for Russia and the United States.3 Third, some officially commissioned
studies have raised the question of ‘‘low numbers.’’ For example, Paul K. Davis of the RAND
Corporation in 2011 mentioned as one of a series of options ‘‘a reduction to 300 nuclear
weapons with only minimal verification.’’4 In an article published the previous year, three
commentators argued that, ‘‘the United States could address military utility concerns with
only 311 nuclear weapons in its nuclear force structure while maintaining a stable
deterrence.’’5
It is far from certain that reductions to as low as 1,000 total weapons each in Russia
and the United States, much less lower numbers, will be pursued and achieved. The
differences between Russia and the United States on how to proceed are significant.
Unforeseen political developments could lead either state or both to arrest plans for
projected reductions or other force adjustments under New START.
The US government has argued that future negotiated reductions must include
nonstrategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons. In August 2011, Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller said, ‘‘The United
States has made it clear that we are committed to continuing a step-by-step process to
reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future
agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons*
strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.’’6
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Russia currently manifests little interest in further negotiations, especially negotia-
tions limited to devising constraints on nuclear arms, including the ‘‘aggregate ceilings’’
with ‘‘freedom mix’’ approach advocated by the US government. Russian leaders have
responded to the US proposals by setting out demands for an even more comprehen-
sive negotiations agenda that seem deliberately framed to be impractical. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has, for example, urged consideration of ‘‘the totality of
factors that could erode strategic stability,’’ including ‘‘the prospect of weapons in
outer space, plans for the creation of non-nuclear strategic missile systems, the unilateral
strategic missile defense buildup, and the growing imbalance in conventional
weapons.’’7
In March 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the
restructuring of US missile defense investments would include an abandonment of the
previously projected fourth phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA),
the principal US contribution to NATO’s strategic missile defense program for the
protection of allied territory, forces, and population centers.8 The EPAA’s planned fourth
phase had been strongly criticized by Russian observers, partly because it was to have
included an ability to intercept ICBMs. In view of the prominence of the EPAA’s fourth
phase in Russian objections to US missile defense efforts, many observers hypothesized
that its abandonment might lead Moscow to moderate its opposition to US missile
defenses and to become more forthcoming about missile defense cooperation with the
United States and NATO as a whole and about nuclear arms control. As of April 2013,
however, the Russians have continued to express profound reservations about US missile
defenses and to demand guarantees that they could not be employed to intercept Russian
missiles.9
Owing to the Russian lack of interest, the prospects for a negotiation based on an
aggregate ceiling approach for all US and Russian nuclear weapons (deployed and non-
deployed, strategic and nonstrategic) currently appear almost as doubtful as those
for a more comprehensive agenda encompassing strategic missile defenses, long-range
non-nuclear precision systems, conventional military forces, and other capabilities.
Fear of how the United States might expand or improve its nuclear posture after the
expiration of New START, either at its termination date or after its one allowable extension,
might lead Russia to reconsider its position and accept US proposals to negotiate further
reductions in Russian and US nuclear forces. On the US side, President Barack Obama’s
administration favors a negotiation with Russia to further its nuclear reduction goals
during its second and final term in office.
If Russian and US nuclear force reductions did take place, it is not clear that
decreases to low numbers would necessarily be negotiated on a bilateral US-Russian
basis. Reductions might be taken on a unilateral but reciprocal basis, outside a legally-
binding agreement, and they might not necessarily be closely coordinated with the
other side; or, reductions might hypothetically be pursued on a multilateral basis.
Furthermore, the possibility that previous reductions might be reversed, while unlikely,
cannot be completely ruled out for either Russia or the United States, depending on
events.
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Aims and Definitions
Despite the fact that multiple outcomes remain possible, this article investigates as a
Gedankenexperiment the single case, however implausible, of a continued process of
reductions in the total stockpiles of US and Russian nuclear weapons to ‘‘low numbers,’’
defined as 1,000 or fewer.10 The article focuses on (a) identifying the potential implications
for strategic stability in Europe of such reductions and (b) examining possible mechanisms
to manage the instability that might arise in Europe owing in part to such reductions.
The term ‘‘strategic stability’’ is defined simply as a situation in which there is a low
probability of major-power war. Important military capability factors in addition to
numbers of nuclear weapons could affect prospects for strategic stability. Moreover, while
force postures may play a critical role in deterrence, crisis management, and operations,
strategic stability depends fundamentally on political factors, including the objectives and
decision-making dynamics of the potential antagonists.11
The prospects for maintaining strategic stability in Europe in the context of
reductions of US and Russian nuclear weapons to low numbers depend on a large number
of factors that might interact in unpredictable ways. As indicated at the outset, this article
offers a brief overview of the historical background concerning the apparent contribution
of nuclear weapons to strategic stability in Europe since the foundation of NATO before
turning to the ‘‘baseline’’*that is, the current situation. It then turns to an analysis of the
potential implications of US and Russian nuclear force reductions to low numbers for
security and stability in Europe, followed by a discussion of suggested mechanisms for
containing possible instability in Europe.
The topic*the risks that might arise with low numbers and possible means to
address those risks*is inherently speculative. However, the history of US and NATO policy
debates offers a basis for suppositions about possible future issues. Moreover, in order to
reinforce and complement the historical analysis and illustrate viewpoints regarding risks
that might be anticipated in a hypothetical low numbers situation*and potential means
to mitigate or compensate for those risks*the author discussed the issues with informed
observers in NATO Europe in June and July 2012.12
The Contribution of Nuclear Weapons to Strategic Stability in Europe Since 1949
The NATO European allies have relied on US nuclear forces as a critical element of US
extended deterrence and strategic stability in relations with Moscow since the foundation
of the alliance. Indeed, some Western European states relied on US nuclear protection in
the late 1940s even before the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.13
The central nuclear deterrence relationship affecting strategic stability in Europe has
remained the one between Moscow and Washington, but the situation has long been
more complicated than simply that of a bipolar deterrence relationship. First, the United
Kingdom and France have for decades contributed to NATO’s overall nuclear deterrence
posture.14 Second, several non-nuclear weapon state NATO allies have also contributed to
that posture since the 1950s by hosting US nuclear weapons and/or providing delivery
systems and/or other capabilities for combined operations.15 Third, since the end of the
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Cold War in 198991, NATO’s three nuclear weapon states have made clear that their
nuclear deterrence capabilities are intended to affect the decision making of both major
and regional powers within and beyond Europe that might become adversaries under
certain circumstances.
Another fundamental aspect of the ‘‘historical dynamics’’ of nuclear deterrence in
Europe is that some states (including Sweden and Switzerland) seriously considered
pursuing national nuclear weapons programs but decided not to do so, partly in view of
their judgments as to the reliability of the US extended nuclear deterrence protection
explicitly offered to the NATO allies. For example, according to political economist Paul
Cole’s analysis, ‘‘Swedish officials . . .were confident that Sweden was covered by the US
nuclear umbrella extended to European allies . . . [I]n a series of not-for-attribution
conversations among Swedish and American officials, senior Swedish defense officials
explicitly stated in the 1980s that Sweden’s defense planning in the post-war era has been
based on the assumption that Sweden is protected by the American nuclear umbrella.’’16
Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany were technically and financially capable of
conducting national nuclear weapons programs but did not do so for historical and
political reasons. They stipulated, however, in acceding to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), that they expected continuing protection from US
extended nuclear deterrence in the NATO framework. For example, the Bonn government
stated in 1969 upon signing the NPT that, ‘‘The Federal Government [of Germany]
understands that. . . the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall
continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system.’’ Moreover, in the same
signing statement, the West German government stipulated that ‘‘the Treaty shall not
hamper the unification of the European States.’’17 The Italian government noted ‘‘the full
compatibility of the Treaty with the existing security agreements,’’ and signed it ‘‘in the
firm belief that nothing in it is an obstacle to the unification of the Countries of Western
Europe and to the justified expectations that the peoples of this area have in the
developments and progress towards unity with a view to the creation of a European
entity.’’18
In summary, with all due regard for the contributions of the independent nuclear
forces of France and the United Kingdom, the NATO allies (and some non-NATO states
in Europe) have depended heavily on US nuclear protection since the late 1940s. The first
Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, approved by NATO in
December 1949, included a US commitment to employ nuclear weapons in defense of the
alliance.19 That commitment has been reformulated in various ways over the decades, but
it has been sustained.
Baseline: Current Nuclear Forces in NATO
Any analysis of the implications for strategic stability in Europe of further reductions in US
nuclear forces must keep in mind the US role as the principal nuclear security guarantor of
the NATO allies. The alliance’s November 2010 Strategic Concept and the May 2012
Chicago Summit Declaration suggest that this US role will continue.
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In the 2010 Strategic Concept, the NATO allies stated that, ‘‘As long as nuclear
weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.’’20 They added that, ‘‘The supreme
guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the
Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces
of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to
the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.’’21
Before undertaking a survey of potential risks in reductions to low numbers, it is
necessary to review the current nuclear weapon capabilities in NATO. This brief overview
considers recent reductions in UK and French nuclear forces before turning to US nuclear
forces and the continuing commitment to deterrence and war prevention of NATO’s three
nuclear weapon states.
UK and French Nuclear Forces
France and the United Kingdom have made significant reductions in their nuclear forces
since the end of the Cold War. Since phasing out their land-based missiles in the 1990s, the
French have relied on two delivery systems: submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
on nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and air-sol moyenne portée (medium-range air-to-surface,
or ASMP) missiles on aircraft. In March 2008, then-President Nicolas Sarkozy announced
that, ‘‘With respect to the airborne component, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles
and aircraft will be reduced by one-third. . . .After this reduction, . . . our arsenal will
include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half of the maximum number of
warheads we had during the Cold War.’’22
Since retiring its last air-deliverable nuclear weapons in 1998, the United Kingdom
has relied exclusively on Trident SLBMs. In May 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague
revealed that ‘‘in future, our overall stockpile will not exceed 225 nuclear warheads. This is
a significant step forward on previous policy, which was to publish only the number of
warheads classed as ‘operationally available,’ the maximum number of which will remain
at 160.’’23 In October 2010, the UK government indicated that it had ‘‘concluded that we
can meet the minimum requirement of an effective and credible level of deterrence with a
smaller nuclear weapons capability.’’ As a consequence, it reduced the ‘‘requirement for
operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120.’’ By reducing
the number of SLBMs per operational SSBN to ‘‘no more than eight,’’ the UK government
added, it will be able ‘‘to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not
more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid 2020s.’’24
While the modernization of the UK and French delivery systems is underway, no
reductions beyond those already announced appear likely in the foreseeable future.
US Nuclear Forces
The United States made public historical data on its holdings of nuclear weapons in May
2010 when the Department of Defense announced that, ‘‘As of September 30, 2009, the
US stockpile of nuclear weapons consisted of 5,113 warheads.’’ This level represented
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substantial reductions in comparison with heights reached during the Cold War. ‘‘This
number [i.e., 5,113] represents an 84 percent reduction from the stockpile’s maximum
(31,255) at the end of fiscal year 1967, and over a 75 percent reduction from its level
(22,217) when the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989.’’25
In June 2011, in its last report on the implementation of the Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty), the US Department of State
indicated that, ‘‘The aggregate number of US ODSNW [operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads] was 1,944 as of February 5, 2011, the final day that the Moscow Treaty
was in force.’’26 The difference between 5,113 and 1,944 is mainly attributable to two
factors: (a) the Moscow Treaty counting rules applied by the United States and (b) the fact
that the total US stockpile includes non-deployed and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
In the first data exchange under New START, published by the Department of State
in June 2011, as of February 5, 2011 (the date of the treaty’s entry-into-force), the parties
reported the following numbers:
in the category of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, 882
for the United States and 521 for Russia (the treaty ceiling is 700);
in the category of warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear
warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers, 1,800 for the United States and 1,537 for
Russia (the treaty ceiling is 1,550); and
in the category of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-
deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, 1,124 for
the United States and 865 for Russia (the treaty ceiling is 800).27
In other words, at the entry-into-force of New START, US New START-accountable numbers
of warheads and deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers exceeded
the ceilings to be reached by 2018, while Russian holdings were below those levels. In
January 2011, then-Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov told Russia’s upper house of
parliament, the Federation Council, that, ‘‘The treaty doesn’t constrain us in any way. . . Its
parameters considerably exceed our potential today.’’28 In contrast, the United States will
clearly have to make reductions in its forces to conform to New START levels in 2018.
However, the actual number of nuclear warheads maintained by the United States
(and Russia) in 2018 may well be significantly higher than the nominal New START limits,
owing to the counting rules for New START-accountable warheads. According to New
START, ‘‘One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber.’’29
Moscow apparently insisted on this counting rule in conjunction with its rejection of the
transparency and verification measures for bombers sought by the United States. In
independent analyst Pavel Podvig’s words, ‘‘The United States said that it was ready to
count bombers with their actual weapons load, but Russia objected to the transparency
provisions that this arrangement would entail.’’30As a result, to cite Rose Gottemoeller,
‘‘the parties agreed to an attribution rule of one warhead per nuclear-capable heavy
bomber rather than count them as zero.’’31 Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American
Scientists (FAS) estimated in 2010 that, under this counting rule, approximately 450 US
warheads and 860 Russian warheads would not be counted.32
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Moreover, New START does not cover non-deployed or nonstrategic weapons.
Consequently, the nominal limit of 1,550 warheads under New START applies only to
certain categories of weapons in accordance with specific counting rules.
With regard to nonstrategic nuclear warheads, neither the United States nor Russia
has published any precise official information. Kristensen, joined by FAS colleague Robert
Norris, recently estimated that ‘‘the US stockpile includes approximately 760 nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. . . . This includes: nearly 200 active nonstrategic B61 bombs deployed in
Europe; 300 inactive B61s in storage in the United States; and 260 W80-0 warheads for the
navy’s nuclear Tomahawks, which are in the process of being retired.’’33
Estimates of the number of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads are generally
higher and less exact. For example, according to the Congressional Commission’s 2009
report on the US strategic posture, ‘‘Senior Russian experts have reported that Russia has
3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads with a large additional number in reserve.’’34
In 2011, James N. Miller, then-principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy,
testified that:
Unclassified estimates suggest that Russia has 4,000 to 6,500 total nuclear weapons, of
which 2,000 to 4,000 are non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons. We have a good
understanding of the numbers of deployed Russian strategic nuclear warheads . . .We
have significantly less confidence in estimates of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.35
Purposes of the UK, French, and US Nuclear Forces
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are committed to effective
deterrence and war-prevention*an element of strategic stability*and their nuclear
deterrence strategies are not limited to the Cold War concept of deterring Moscow in an
East-West framework. Sometimes called the P-3 (a subset of the Permanent 5 in the UN
Security Council), these three states share a global perspective on international security
challenges and recognize that threats to their national security and that of their allies
could arise within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. In March 2008, then-President
Sarkozy said that:
Today we must all be mindful of the fact that the nuclear missiles of even distant powers
can reach Europe in less than half an hour. Currently only the great powers have such
means. But other countries, in Asia and the Middle East, are vigorously developing
ballistic capabilities. I am thinking in particular of Iran. Iran is increasing the range of its
missiles, while grave suspicions surround its nuclear program. It is indeed Europe’s
security that is at stake.36
In other statements, French officials have distinguished more abstractly between ‘‘major’’
and ‘‘regional’’ power threats to be countered with nuclear deterrence capabilities.37 The
NATO allies have collectively favored reference to ‘‘generic’’ threats instead of specifying
potential adversaries by name in their public statements*referring, for example, to the
proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction rather than to Iran or other
specific proliferants.
The references in NATO’s May 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)
to the ‘‘broader security environment’’ are, however, meant to encompass potential
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adversaries outside the Euro-Atlantic area*e.g., non-Russian contingencies such as may
arise in the Middle East or Asia.38 Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO allies (the P-3 in
particular) have taken an increasingly global view of security challenges, and they should
not*indeed, cannot*be confined to a regional box. NATO’s operations, partnership
activities, and threat assessments have increasingly extended beyond Europe to Africa, the
greater Middle East and Asia, notably with reference to Afghanistan.
Since 1991, the US nuclear and military presence in Europe has been drastically
reduced. Russia’s dependence on nonstrategic nuclear forces has in the meantime
increased, owing to its conventional military weakness and other factors.39 Russia has in
recent years conducted exercises highlighting its nuclear capabilities and ‘‘de-escalation’’
doctrine and simulating nuclear attacks against NATO allies, including Poland.40 The NATO
allies, especially the new allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and certain partners in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace in Europe, such as Finland and Sweden, closely monitor
developments in Russia’s military and nuclear posture.41
Implications of Reductions to Low Numbers
What risks might arise for strategic stability in Europe with reductions to low numbers of
US and Russian nuclear weapons? The implications of reductions to low numbers*
especially on the order of 300 weapons or less*are scenario-dependent, but a number
of significant risks could arise even at a level of 1,000 weapons, to say nothing of even
lower numbers. Some European observers expressed uncertainty about how to distinguish
with precision among the implications of specific lower levels*for instance, 1,000, 500, or
100*and usually took the position that risks would become progressively more acute in
tandem with reductions to lower levels.42
As these European observers noted, the United States has not made clear what
counting rules might apply to the smaller nuclear force envisaged in the January 2012
defense guidance*for instance, whether the numerical limit would apply only to
operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces, as with the 2002 Moscow Treaty, or to
all nuclear weapons, strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and non-deployed, under an
aggregate ceilings limit. If the low numbers level applied only to intercontinental-range
strategic nuclear forces, some European observers said, this could magnify the significance
of the US-Russian imbalance in nonstrategic nuclear weapons. NATO stated in May 2012
that it is ‘‘prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear
weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into
account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the
Euro-Atlantic area.’’43
While this article is focused on potential risks (and the means to address them) from
reductions to low numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons, it should be noted that
some allied observers perceive no risks in such reductions. In their view, deterrence would
be robust and reliable at low numbers. An Italian said in June 2012, ‘‘Nuclear weapons are
political weapons. They are not meant to be employed, so lower numbers would not make
a difference.’’44 Similarly, a German said, ‘‘Deep reductions would not be a problem for us.
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Nobody needs now thousands of nuclear weapons.’’45 Another German said, ‘‘We don’t
need the kind of quantities that exist at the moment. No one foresees any contingency
where nuclear weapons would be needed. That seems very far-fetched. From my point of
view, the arms control point of view, we could live with 300.’’46 Again, it should be recalled
that these views are representative of observers who discern no risks in reductions to low
numbers.
Moreover, some European observers see reductions in US and Russian nuclear forces
as necessary and valuable steps toward nuclear disarmament. In June 2012, an Italian
observer said, ‘‘Italy shares Obama’s long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons,
and reductions would have a beneficial effect.’’47 A German said, ‘‘Our overall goal is global
zero . . .Germany supports all US and Russian reductions.’’48 Another German said, ‘‘Any
reduction in nuclear weapons is seen as a good step in the eyes of most Europeans. In the
public view, nuclear weapons are seen as evil.’’49
It is difficult to offer meaningful generalizations about European views on certain
international security issues because European states and their internal political spectrums
are so diverse. The reactions of specific allies to significant US nuclear force reductions
could differ markedly, depending on their histories, capabilities, and threat perceptions. In
July 2012, a French observer said:
The political consequences of substantial reductions in US nuclear force numbers would
depend on particular cases. The Poles are, for example, disappointed and unsure about
the reliability of American protection, so the US reductions might be taken as another
sign of US unreliability. In contrast, for the Germans, the fewer the nuclear weapons, the
better. The Germans want the US nuclear weapons out of Europe. At this time no one in
Germany is afraid of a Russian attack on Europe. The hypothetical Russian threat is quite
irrelevant in Germany and here in France. Security from terrorism and security from
economic trouble*these are today’s concerns, not aggression and nuclear attack.50
As this statement suggests, views on nuclear deterrence requirements in Europe are often
related to views on Russia. In 2007, a noteworthy study illustrated the complexity and
diversity of views on Russia within the European Union by identifying five distinct policy
approaches among European Union (EU) nations:
‘Trojan Horses’ (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU
system, and are willing to veto common EU positions; ‘Strategic Partners’ (France,
Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia which
occasionally undermines common EU policies; ‘Friendly Pragmatists’ (Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who
maintain a close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above
political goals; ‘Frosty Pragmatists’ (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia,
the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business
interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human
rights or other issues; and ‘New Cold Warriors’ (Lithuania and Poland) who have an
overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU
negotiations with Russia.51 (Emphasis in original.)
Furthermore, broad generalizations such as this one about the views of specific states,
including the twenty-one EU members that are NATO allies, must be qualified by noting
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that there are often competing schools of thought within nations. As Constanze
Stelzenmüller, a fellow with the German Marshall Fund, has written, ‘‘Conventional
wisdom holds that the German political landscape is split between those who are
suspicious of the Russian embrace and those who choose to walk into it deliberately*
between bear haters and bear huggers.’’52 Individual views on Russia and strategic
requirements continue to evolve in light of events.
Because this article offers a survey of the risks that might arise for strategic stability
in Europe in a situation of low numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons, it
concentrates on views of specific potential risks, not on judgments that hold that no
risks would arise for strategic stability or the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence.
It is not possible to make a reliable quantitative differentiation between proponents of
differing views, but there is clearly a divide between those discounting risks and those
concerned about them.
While stout central (or direct) deterrence between two powers may contribute to
strategic stability, the robustness of extended deterrence is also an essential element of
strategic stability. The failure of extended deterrence could lead to the outbreak of a
regional conflict that could then develop into a large-scale war. For this reason, it is
surprising that some analyses have excluded US extended deterrence requirements as if
they were trivial or expendable second-order matters. For example, the authors who
concluded that ‘‘the United States could address military utility concerns with only 311
nuclear weapons in its nuclear force structure while maintaining a stable deterrence’’
explicitly disregarded extended deterrence requirements. They acknowledged their
omission of extended deterrence in a footnote: ‘‘This, of course, is direct deterrence. As
discussed in many places, the protection of allies, forces overseas, or even noncontiguous
possessions (such as Great Britain’s crown colony, the Falkland Islands), are matters of
extended deterrence, which is inherently more difficult.’’53 Allies relying on the nuclear
element of US extended deterrence protection have been less inclined to regard its
requirements as a matter of secondary importance deserving no more than a footnote.
The risks posed by low numbers cited by European experts included the following:
US anti-cities strategies harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed
European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian
cheating, noncompliance, and breakout; incentives to adopt destabilizing first strike,
preemption, or launch-on-warning strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation;
an incentive to competition by nuclear weapon states outside Europe; perceptions of a US
disengagement from extended deterrence; possible fragmentation in alliance defense
efforts; political hedging vis-à-vis Russia and perhaps other powers; increased likelihood of
non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and
French nuclear forces.
US Anti-Cities Strategies Harmful to the Credibility of Extended Deterrence
Several European observers said that reductions to low numbers could lead the United
States to contemplate reliance on anti-cities threats for deterrence. (An anti-cities
strategy*sometimes called a counter-cities or countervalue strategy*is based on
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threatening to attack an adversary’s population centers.) In their view, this could
have damaging implications for the credibility of US extended deterrence and strategic
stability.
The judgment that a US anti-cities strategy would lack credibility has a long history.
Owing in part to the vulnerability of US cities, the United States began in the 1960s to
develop capabilities and plans providing for greater flexibility, discrimination, and
presidential choice in US nuclear employment options. In the mid-1970s, the United
States made public an increasingly discriminate capacity to employ limited strategic
nuclear options (popularly known as the Schlesinger Doctrine) that was intended*among
other purposes*to reinforce the credibility of extended deterrence. In the words of James
Schlesinger, who served as secretary of defense in 197375, ‘‘We had to persuade the
Russians and our European allies that extended deterrence still worked, even though the
Soviet Union could now destroy our cities.’’54
In other words, the United States has long required options other than threatening
an adversary’s cities to bolster the credibility of its extended deterrence commitments.
How many US nuclear weapons are required in support of this purpose? In 1991, former
Pentagon official Walter Slocombe advanced the following judgment:
A reasonable goal should be to reduce to levels of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 highly
survivable and flexible weapons so as to preserve a capability for a targeting doctrine
that is not limited to attacks on cities and for enough diversity of forces to enhance their
survivability. . . . If 2,500 is enough, however, there are levels that are too low. From the
point of view of maintaining plausible extended deterrence, still lower levels, say a few
hundred, geared to a purely city-busting doctrine of deterrence would be wholly
inadequate for a European role, in which the United States, to be effective, must present
a credible potential for less than all-out attacks. At such force levels, targeting is
effectively confined to attacking urban and industrial centers*a doctrine that has little
credibility for extended deterrence, whatever its potential for deterring all-out attacks on
similar targets in the United States itself.55
Several contemporary European observers endorse Slocombe’s view that ‘‘a few hundred
[weapons], geared to a purely city-busting doctrine of deterrence would be wholly
inadequate for a European role.’’ For example, an Italian said, ‘‘An anti-cities strategy
would undermine the credibility of extended deterrence. Non-strategic nuclear weapons
were accepted because they were assigned military targets.’’56 According to a German
observer:
An anti-cities strategy would run counter to the logic of US nuclear policy for the last fifty
years. It would equal self-deterrence, and it would be the antithesis of extended
deterrence. You don’t target an opponent’s cities for the defense of an ally. Only in the
most existential circumstances can an anti-cities strategy be a strategy. The credibility of
US extended deterrence would be drastically reduced. It would mean that the US would
probably never implement a nuclear threat, so there would be little to rely on for
extended deterrence.57
A British observer said, ‘‘Politically, there would be a legitimization of enemy strikes on US
cities if the US aimed at enemy cities. The NATO allies devised a graduated response
strategy*a proportionate response*because it was not plausible that the US would put
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its cities at risk for a small part of Germany or, today, Poland. A counter-cities strategy
would lead to nervousness and destabilization.’’58 A Polish observer added, ‘‘A counter-
force demonstration of will and commitment is something you wouldn’t be doing if you
had only 200 to 300 warheads. The US has global responsibilities, and it should not be
considering such low numbers.’’59
In other words, some European observers fear that an anti-cities strategy would
translate into a weakening of US deterrence capacity*that is, a higher risk of deterrence
failure. In a low numbers situation, the United States would have less flexibility in its
nuclear posture to meet multiple obligations and deal with diverse contingencies. A
substantially smaller nuclear posture might therefore mean a degraded US ability to deter
adversaries and defend allies in the event of deterrence failure.
Renewed European Anxiety About a US-Russian Condominium
One of the risks in a US-Russian agreement, whether formal or informal, to reduce nuclear
forces to low numbers might be a reawakening of a recurrent European anxiety*that is,
US-Russian bilateralism at the expense of the security of the NATO allies. Fear of such a
condominium could be revived by a Washington-Moscow consensus on nuclear force
requirements. Historical examples include the 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War agreement
and the debate within the alliance about the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT II) in the late 1970s.
The Soviet Union proposed the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in
1972. Henry Kissinger, who was then President Richard M. Nixon’s national security advisor,
described the original Soviet draft as follows: ‘‘The proposed agreement did not preclude
the use of nuclear weapons in a war involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact; however, their
use would have to be confined to the territory of allies; employment against the territory
of the United States and the Soviet Union was proscribed. . . .It would have been difficult
to draw up a more bald or cynical definition of condominium.’’60
In negotiating the final text of the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of
Nuclear War, the United States did its best to limit the damage it entailed to US relations
with other governments. However, according to leading French diplomatic historian
Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘‘This agreement was understood in Paris as tantamount to a
Soviet-American condominium over Europe.’’61 Kissinger summed up his judgment as to
its impact on US alliance relations in Europe as follows: ‘‘We gained a marginally useful
text. But the result was too subtle; the negotiation too secret; the effort too protracted; the
necessary explanations to allies and China too complex to have the desired impact. The
Europeans were especially sensitive. . . . [A]llied unity eluded us despite the intensive
consultation.’’62
A number of expert observers in NATO Europe criticized the SALT II Treaty, signed by
US President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in 1979, because
in their judgment the United States had neglected European security interests. Their
specific criticisms included the judgments that the treaty provisions (a) would assist the
Soviet Union in gaining ICBM-based counterforce superiority; (b) would constrain NATO’s
theater nuclear force modernization, notably with regard to cruise missiles; and (c) would
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not address the growing Soviet advantage in intermediate-range missiles (such as the
SS-20) and bombers (such as the Backfire).63 For example, Laurence Martin, a prominent
British scholar in strategic studies, wrote that, ‘‘Tolerating the Soviet Backfire bomber so
long as it is not deployed in an anti-United States mode*that is, so long as it is deployed
against areas bordering the Warsaw Pact*is only the most explicit instance of going
beyond merely neglecting threats to allies to actually diverting them in that direction,
behavior of which [Soviet leader Joseph] Stalin suspected [UK Prime Minister Neville]
Chamberlain in 1939.’’64
There is an obvious connection between fears of a Moscow-Washington condomi-
nium at the expense of allies and the prospect of US reliance on ‘‘anti-cities’’ strategies. If
anti-cities targeting strategies were regarded as credible and effective only for central US-
Russian deterrence, reductions to low numbers could be construed as implying decreased
credibility for extended deterrence and a de facto shifting of risks away from Russia and
the United States toward European allies.
A British observer said in July 2012 that, ‘‘The fear of condominium might be felt
most strongly in Poland and the Baltic states and maybe in France. It would depend in part
on how clumsily the US and Russia proclaimed the new nuclear order.’’65 A German
observer agreed: ‘‘Whether there would be perceptions of a US-Russian condominium at
the expense of the European allies would depend on the political atmosphere.’’66
The alliance’s ‘‘three no’s’’ pledge offers an example of how an effort to take Russian
concerns into account could lead some allies to deplore an apparent lack of attention to
their security requirements. NATO allies first extended this pledge in December 1996:
‘‘Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture and
therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear
weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s
nuclear posture or nuclear policy*and we do not foresee any future need to do so.’’67
This pledge was repeated in the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, a political
declaration by the NATO allies and the Russian Federation.68
The NATO allies made these declarations before they invited the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland to join the alliance in July 1997. The ‘‘three no’s pledge’’ was not
welcomed by all observers in the new allied states, as became clear at a workshop in
March 2010:
A Polish participant said, ‘‘We were very unhappy with the three no’s when the Founding
Act was signed,’’ because it implied ‘‘a secondary membership for some allies.’’ Another
Pole said that the NATO-Russia Founding Act language implied ‘‘an unequal security
status’’ for Poland and the other new allies. At a minimum, he said, the allies should
uphold the commitment in the NATO-Russia Founding Act not to change NATO’s nuclear
deterrence posture, and ensure that the new allies have equality in contingency planning
and infrastructure for collective defense.69
Greater Vulnerability to Russian Cheating, Noncompliance, and Breakout
The risk of increased vulnerability to Russian cheating, noncompliance, and breakout from
agreed obligations is not a new issue with regard to the implications of hypothesized low
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numbers. As long ago as 1991, Walter Slocombe pointed out that ‘‘small forces,’’ which he
defined as ‘‘a few hundred’’ nuclear warheads, ‘‘would be susceptible to cheating and
vulnerable to technological breakthroughs.’’70 In the words of an Italian in June 2012,
‘‘With low numbers, the effects of cheating could be much larger and much more difficult
to offset.’’71 A Polish observer added in July 2012, ‘‘With a small posture at low numbers,
the questions of verification and possible noncompliance and breakout would be greater
issues than with a larger posture.’’72
As an example in recent history of Russian noncompliance or inadequate
compliance, European observers often cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives*the
commitments articulated by Presidents George H. W. Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris
Yeltsin in 199192.73 The United States has fully implemented its 1991 commitments to
reduce and/or eliminate its stockpile of certain types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons,
while Russia has evidently not done so.74 Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin promised to
eliminate all nuclear warheads for artillery and land-based tactical missiles, for example, yet
the Russian defense ministry website affirmed the continuing importance of these nuclear
capabilities as recently as May 2011.75 In 2004, a Russian defense ministry representative
said that, ‘‘we are not going to report back to anybody with figures in our hands about
how many and what kind of specific tactical nuclear arms we have reduced.’’76
Moscow and Washington have, to be sure, taken the risk of cheating into account
since their first nuclear arms negotiations in the late 1960s. As Department of Defense
official Brad Roberts observed in 2009, ‘‘As numbers come down, both the United States
and Russia will worry increasingly about how quickly and competitively the other might
try to send them back up, and each has different capacities to reassure itself that it would
not be taken advantage of in this manner.’’77
A rigorous verification regime might well be necessary for the United States and its
NATO allies and partners to have confidence in Russian compliance with a treaty providing
for reductions to low numbers. However, the challenges in developing such a verification
regime would be daunting, and it might not be completed before the expiration date of
New START.
Incentives to Adopt Destabilizing First Strike, Preemption, or Launch-
on-Warning Strategies
One of the historical rationales for a survivable and numerically large US strategic nuclear
posture has been to lessen the vulnerability of the United States to hypothetical disarming
first strike attacks by an adversary. In NATO, it has for decades been axiomatic that US
extended deterrence for allies cannot be credible and reliable unless the central
deterrence relationship between Russia and the United States is stable. Movement to
low numbers could raise questions in this regard.
Some European observers said that moving to significantly smaller nuclear force
postures could tempt adversaries to consider first strike or preemption strategies or to
adopt launch-on-warning postures that could undermine extended deterrence and
strategic stability. A Polish expert said, for example, that, ‘‘A ‘first strike’ strategy would
be more tempting for an enemy with a small posture.’’78 An Italian added that, ‘‘Increased
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pressure for a first strike*or launch-on-warning*because of low numbers would be bad
for extended deterrence and bad for strategic stability. It would bring us back to the 1950s
and the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.’’79 A British observer remarked:
With a low numbers posture, there would be a greater temptation for preemption. It
would be destabilizing, because there would be no*or fewer*reserves and no ability to
wait and think. At significantly lower numbers, there would be a greater risk of getting
into a so-called hair-trigger situation, with missiles poised to launch before destruction.80
Another British observer said that further reductions in US nuclear forces might degrade
the US ability to control escalation in a confrontation or conflict.
In other words, the risks could include anxieties among US and allied political elites
about the stability of the US-Russian balance and the reliability of US extended deterrence.
The US-Russian balance could appear (and might actually be) less stable to the extent that
smaller forces were more vulnerable to preemptive attacks and strategic defenses, among
other factors. As Henry Kissinger and former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft recently
wrote, ‘‘Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively
low numbers could lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable.’’81
The precise design of the force structure, including the survivability of delivery
platforms and command and control systems, could affect the prospects for stability. Even
with ‘‘freedom to mix’’ provisions, it could be difficult with low numbers for Russia and the
United States to ensure that their force structures included sufficient numbers of the
highly survivable retaliatory (or second-strike) capabilities that are widely believed to
contribute to strategic stability. The predominant view among US officials and experts
holds that SSBN-based weapons would be the most survivable, assuming that the oceans
are unlikely to become transparent. Relying mainly on SSBNs would, however, imply risks,
such as the failure of a specific warhead or missile type or SSBN system.
Potential Stimulus to Nuclear Proliferation
One of the historical motives of the United States in offering extended nuclear deterrence
protection to its NATO allies has been to promote nuclear nonproliferation. This principle
has included associated arrangements for consultations such as the Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG). An official but long-classified US report in 1974 summarized the US motives
in supporting the founding of the NPG in 196667 as follows:
The US fostered the establishment of the NPG to satisfy the desire of most of our Allies*
and particularly the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]*to have a voice in the
formulation of Alliance nuclear policy; to reassure Allies of US nuclear commitment; to
foster a better understanding among Allies of uses and limitations of nuclear weapons; to
blunt proliferation pressures; and to mitigate concern over ultimate US control over use of
nuclear weapons.82 (Emphasis added)
In the judgment of allied observers, credible US extended nuclear deterrence required the
United States to look beyond the requirements of mutual assured destruction to develop
options for escalation control in conjunction with a capacity for the limited employment of
nuclear forces. One of the objectives in pursuing this multifaceted posture, with diverse
220 DAVID S. YOST
nuclear employment options, was to provide credible extended nuclear deterrence
protection to allies that might otherwise seek nuclear weapons of their own. According to
German scholar Joachim Krause of the University of Kiel:
Had the US embarked on mutual assured destruction as the guiding principle of its
nuclear weapons doctrine, it could not have deterred the Soviet Union from an invasion
of western Europe. The result would have been the collapse of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, since this was based on a credible extended deterrence for
states that otherwise would have gone nuclear. . . . [T]he readiness of the United States
to pursue nuclear deterrence options even under conditions of an increasing Soviet
nuclear threat made it possible for nuclear weapons candidates to refrain from
pursuing nuclear weapons options of their own. It sounds paradoxical, but the often
criticized nuclear arms race was, on the US side, a desperate attempt to uphold extended
deterrence under adverse conditions, and was thus responsible for the continued
effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.83
This historical background explains why the prospect of US reductions to low numbers*
and the concomitant diminution of US nuclear employment options*raises questions
about potential consequences for nuclear nonproliferation.
Some European observers ruled out the possibility of any NATO state seeking a
national nuclear weapons capability as a consequence of the United States reducing its
nuclear forces to low numbers. For example, according to a Polish observer, ‘‘In my
judgment, additional national nuclear weapons programs in NATO are absolutely
unthinkable, even in Turkey. I don’t buy it. I can’t see it happening just because the
Americans reduce to 1,000 nuclear weapons.’’84 Similarly, an Italian observer said that it
would be ‘‘politically difficult’’ for European non-nuclear weapon states to withdraw from
the NPT. ‘‘It would require a really frightening Russia*and a really retreating United
States.’’85
The same Italian observer said, however, that Turkey faces a particularly challenging
situation: ‘‘Turkey is more threatened than other NATO allies. Turkey lives in a more
difficult environment and is more politically isolated. Turkey may face both Iran and Russia
as nuclear threats.’’86 According to a British observer, in the context of the US move to a
low numbers nuclear posture, ‘‘Turkey, Japan, and South Korea would be the US allies
most likely to seek their own nuclear weapons.’’87
Turkish observers expressed diverse views. For example, a Turk drew attention to
long-standing uncertainties, as seen from Ankara, about the reliability of NATO collective
defense commitments: ‘‘Iran is developing nuclear weapons, and Turkey is supposed to be
protected by the NATO alliance’s nuclear deterrent. How reliable is that guarantee? We
remember the Johnson letter in 1964, the embargo after the 1974 Cyprus intervention,
Germany’s reluctance to contribute to the defense of Turkey in the 1990-91 Gulf War, and
the French reluctance in the 2003 NATO deliberations.’’88
Some Turks said emphatically that Turkey will nonetheless continue to rely on US
extended nuclear deterrence under NATO auspices, partly because ‘‘a national nuclear
weapons program would entail unacceptable penalties*unaffordable political and
economic costs.’’89 Other Turks said that, despite Turkey’s preference to rely on US
nuclear deterrence protection in a NATO framework, in future circumstances*especially
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in the presence of a nuclear-armed Iran and nuclear weapon programs in other Middle
Eastern states*Turkey might face pressures to pursue its own nuclear weapons. These
pressures might be more potent if US extended nuclear deterrence protection appeared
less reliable in the context of reductions in US nuclear weapons to a low numbers
posture.90
In sum, anxieties among political elites stemming from a low numbers US nuclear
deterrence posture might lead to renewed attention to the possible pursuit of national
nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapon states, including Turkey. Camille Grand,
director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris, recently wrote that ‘‘a
potential side-effect of moving to (very) low numbers is to weaken the nuclear guarantees
provided by the US in particular, with a potential incentive for proliferation among non-
nuclear US allies.’’91
Moreover, perceptions of US extended nuclear deterrence as less reliable could have
adverse effects in the Middle East. If Middle Eastern states appeared more inclined to
pursue nuclear weapons, this could also stimulate interest in national nuclear weapon
programs in Turkey and perhaps other states. This might be especially the case if the
United States failed to respond in an effective and credible way to nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East. If one of the consequences of a low numbers US nuclear deterrence
posture was to stimulate nuclear proliferation and weaken the nuclear nonproliferation
regime in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and other regions, the likelihood of some US
allies and security partners reconsidering their national nuclear defense options might well
increase.
Incentive to Competition by Nuclear Weapon States Outside Europe
Some European observers said that reductions in US and Russian nuclear forces to low
levels could incite risky and destabilizing arms competitions. In their view, China, India,
Pakistan, and perhaps other nuclear weapon states might perceive incentives to sprint to
parity and beyond.92
In other words, the implications of low numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons
are, as a Polish expert put it, ‘‘much more complicated than NATO and Russia.’’93 In the
words of a British observer, ‘‘Negotiations with the Russians would be only one factor in
US assessments about the implications of significant reductions in nuclear weapons
because the US has to address global requirements, including China and extended
deterrence responsibilities in various regions.’’94 This matters for Europe because
European security interests are implicated in risks for strategic stability in other regions.
A French observer said that, even if Russia and the United States undertook further nuclear
force reductions, China and Pakistan ‘‘would probably continue to expand their nuclear
forces.’’95
Several European observers said that in contemplating nuclear force reductions the
United States should take into account its need to be able to deter multiple powers in
addition to Russia*particularly China. A Turkish observer said, ‘‘China and Russia and Iran
could form a bloc. In fact, they are almost there on the Syrian issue.’’96
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A British observer said, ‘‘Will the US accept a mutual deterrence relationship with
China? That will be an important factor in discussing reductions in the US strategic nuclear
stockpile.’’97 Another British observer said that ‘‘US nuclear weapons numbers cannot go
lower than the Chinese numbers, nor would the Russians wish for their numbers to do so.
China puts a practical lower limit on the US and Russian numbers.’’98 A German said, ‘‘No
‘sprint to parity’ by China will be necessary if the US and Russia come down to low
numbers.’’99
Some European observers said that the United States and Russia should take care in
any reductions process to ensure that third parties are dissuaded from trying to catch up
with the numbers of nuclear weapons retained by Moscow and Washington. According to
a Turkish observer, ‘‘Moscow and Washington should . . . be restrained in their reductions.
The US and Russia need to be in a strong position to insist that other countries not try to
catch up. They need to create a context in which it would be hard for countries to
convince others that more nuclear weapons would be acceptable. The US and Russia need
to be able to put them on the spot if they seek more nuclear weapons and dissuade them
from doing so.’’100 This comment by a Turkish expert is reminiscent of a passage in the
2009 report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States:
Another element of deterrence, in our broad concept, is dissuasion. In this period of
uncertainty about Russia and China and their future international roles, the United States
should be seeking to discourage unwelcome competition while encouraging strategic
cooperation. Toward that end, the United States should so compose its nuclear force as
to discourage Russia and China from trying to compete with the United States for some
new advantage in the nuclear realm. The United States should retain enough capacity,
whether in its existing delivery systems and supply of reserve warheads or in its
infrastructure, to impress upon Russian leaders the impossibility of gaining a position of
nuclear supremacy over the United States by breaking out of an arms control agreement.
The United States (and Russia) should also retain a large enough force of nuclear
weapons that China is not tempted to try to reach a posture of strategic equivalency with
the United States or of strategic supremacy in the Asian theater.101
This matters for European security because it suggests that at least some Europeans judge
that a US-Russian duopoly would provide for strategic stability more reliably than a more
equal multipolar distribution of numbers of nuclear weapons, with China and perhaps
other states trying to catch up to US and Russian levels.
Perceptions of a US Disengagement from Extended Deterrence
Some European observers said that US nuclear force reductions to low numbers might be
perceived as a US disengagement from extended deterrence responsibilities in Europe and
other regions. A British observer said, ‘‘Once doubts emerge about US capability and
commitment, concerns will be acute, especially in Japan, South Korea, Poland, and the
Baltic states.’’102 Another British observer said:
Allies such as Poland and the Baltic states would probably understand such reductions as
reflecting a diminished concern for their security. The US would appear to be motivated
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by an ideological goal of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and/or by a
desire to escape extended deterrence risks and/or simply to save money as higher
priorities than standing by exposed allies. It’s hard to know how to persuade them that
such an interpretation is not true.103
Some European observers highlighted the risk of a perception, recurrent in the alliance
since the late 1950s, of the United States seeking to escape the risks for its national
security in extending nuclear deterrence commitments to allies. A German said, for
example, that, ‘‘Lowering the number of US nuclear weapons further could be perceived
as the US trying to get out of nuclear risks and responsibilities in support of allies. It could
be seen as the US counterpart to the German efforts to get the US nuclear weapons out of
Germany.’’104
If the United States decided to withdraw all the remaining US nuclear weapons in
Europe, this would put an end to the nuclear-sharing programs with selected NATO allies.
These programs, established in the late 1950s, have become highly valued by some allies
as a demonstration of US commitment and the supreme form of the ‘‘coupling’’ of US and
allied security interests. Ending the risk- and responsibility-sharing based on US nuclear
weapons in Europe would be seen by some allied observers as proof of a decisive US
disengagement from long-standing security commitments.105 In May 2012, three former
defense ministers from Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland wrote that, ‘‘reducing the presence
of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would add to the concerns expressed by many
European leaders about US long-term commitments to the continent.’’106
The NATO allies acknowledged the continuing importance of nuclear risk- and
responsibility-sharing arrangements in the May 2012 DDPR: ‘‘Consistent with our
commitment to remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist, Allies
agree that the NAC [North Atlantic Council] will task the appropriate committees to
develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies
concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements, including in case NATO were to decide
to reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe.’’107
Possible Fragmentation in Alliance Defense Efforts
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989-91, a number of observers have speculated that the
alliance’s cohesion could atrophy, particularly in the absence of strong leadership and
commitment by the United States. The consequences might, it has been argued, include a
‘‘renationalization’’ of the defense policies of NATO states and the formation of new
antagonisms among these countries, even if the alliance’s institutions continued to
function in an empty and superficial fashion.108 In 1992, for example, Manfred Wörner, the
former German minister of defense then serving as NATO’s secretary-general, said, ‘‘If the
United States disengages, I foresee a certain temptation for Western European nations to
revert to past patterns of power politics.’’109
Some added, however, that financial factors could limit the impact on NATO of
decreased confidence in US extended deterrence. In the words of an Italian observer,
‘‘If there were a breakdown of NATO and US extended deterrence in Europe, the
renationalization of defense policies in Europe could be the result. The limit on aspirations
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to stronger national defense policies is the finance part.’’110 A British observer said,
‘‘Reduced US credibility could lead to the renationalization of defense policies in Europe if
badly handled, but it is not very likely. Almost everyone would prefer to keep NATO going,
partly for financial reasons. There would be a clamor for reassurance and repeated US
guarantees from most states. There is a desire for US assurances, even if they are not that
credible.’’111
Political Hedging Vis-à-Vis Russia and Perhaps Other Powers
Some European observers expressed concern that a US nuclear weapon posture at low
numbers could lead to decreased confidence in the ability and will of the United States to
serve as the preeminent global military power and the leader of NATO. In this situation,
some European observers said, certain European allies could be more inclined than others
to engage in political ‘‘hedging’’ policies in relations with Russia and perhaps other
powers.
For example, an Italian observer said, ‘‘Some countries might seek other security
assurances, starting with the modification of their foreign policies. They might become
more flexible and deferential with the Russians*and more compliant with Russian
preferences.’’112 A Briton added, ‘‘Some people will hedge. They are already hedging by
buying Russian energy resources, supporting the removal of US nuclear weapons from
Europe, muting their criticism of Russia regarding the invasion of Georgia, opposing NATO
enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine, and dragging their feet on contingency plans and
live exercises to defend the Baltic states.’’113
Increased Likelihood of Non-Nuclear Arms Competitions and Conflicts
Some European observers expressed concern that deep reductions in US nuclear forces
could narrow the scope of US nuclear deterrence protection. According to an Italian
observer, US deterrence might not deter war completely, but it would deter:
only the use of nuclear weapons, and possibly only the use of nuclear weapons against
the US. The US guarantee to the NATO allies would be less comprehensive than it is now,
and that would force the allies to reconsider their strategic situation.114
If a US nuclear deterrence posture at low numbers led to a US anti-cities strategy and a
corresponding constriction of the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence commit-
ment, some European observers have argued, this could signify an increased likelihood of
non-nuclear war. In the words of a German observer, ‘‘Wars could become more feasible
because the nuclear risks would be reduced.’’115 A British observer said, ‘‘Taking away the
nuclear weapons, or radically reducing the numbers, would make non-nuclear weapons
more usable and international politics more unstable.’’116
These remarks suggest that one of the implications of reductions of US nuclear forces
to low numbers could be to revive concerns among NATO allied observers comparable to
those evoked by ‘‘sole purpose’’ advocacy. The ‘‘sole purpose’’ goal*that is, ‘‘the objective
of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the
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sole purpose of US nuclear weapons’’*has raised concerns among some allied observers
because it implies a removal of US nuclear protection in relation to non-nuclear threats.117
Critical allied observers judge that a ‘‘sole purpose’’ policy would be inadequate for an
alliance facing a variety of non-nuclear threats. Indeed, some observers argue, the assurance
that nuclear weapons would be employed only in response to the use of nuclear weapons
could invite aggression by non-nuclear means and thereby diminish strategic stability.
It should be noted that the US government has endorsed ‘‘sole purpose’’ as an
objective, but has not adopted it as a policy. According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR):
. . .there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still
play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW [chemical or biological weapon] attack
against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not
prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that the ‘sole purpose’ of US
nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and
partners, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely
adopted.118
The NPR did not spell out all of the requisite conditions, but referred to ‘‘efforts to
strengthen regional security architectures and eliminate chemical and biological weapons,
so that over time all states possessing nuclear weapons can be secure in making
deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.’’119
Some allied observers have expressed reservations about the objective of narrowing
the scope of nuclear deterrence. The French government has, for example, long taken the
view that reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence would equate to an increased reliance
on conventional forces and a consequently higher risk of conventional arms competitions
and war. In the 1994 defense white paper, for example, the French ministry of defense
declared that:
It is illusory and dangerous to claim that such [conventional] technologies could have
the effect of preventing war as nuclear weapons do. All the lessons of history argue
against it. These conceptions emphasize conventional force balances, which are by
nature unstable and based on operational strategies, for preparing and conducting war.
They suggest the possibility of resolving international problems through the use of force
and imply an arms race. They are not compatible with our strategy. Far from substituting
for nuclear deterrence, a so-called conventional deterrent could only complement it. . . .
Moreover, nuclear weapons remain the means to compensate, if necessary, for possible
insufficiencies in other areas, and allow for an avoidance of a ‘conventional arms race’
that would be contrary to our defense policy and unacceptable from a financial
viewpoint.120
Controversial Pressures on UK and French Nuclear Forces
The United Kingdom and France both maintain that their current nuclear forces are at a
minimal level. US and Russian reductions to low numbers would nonetheless create strong
pressures on both states to diminish their numbers as well, as they have done in the past
in the context of nuclear force reductions by Washington and Moscow. While these
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powerful pressures to reduce nuclear force numbers could create discord between the
two Western European nuclear powers and their European allies, some minority political
movements in the United Kingdom, France, and other European states might argue that
London and Paris should retain their nuclear forces at current levels and even make up for
US reductions to some extent. If the United Kingdom and France did undertake substantial
further reductions in their nuclear forces, the question of their ability to penetrate the
missile defenses of Russia and other potential adversaries might arise. If their technical
credibility against major powers with missile defenses became dubious, UK and French
forces might be seen as relevant only against regional powers*which could make them
politically more difficult to sustain.
Among other arguments for not participating in nuclear arms control negotia-
tions, London and Paris have historically highlighted the numerical disparity between
their nuclear forces and those maintained by Moscow and Washington. In 1995, for
example, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that, ‘‘[E]ven when START II is
implemented, British nuclear forces will be considerably less than 10% of the total
nuclear forces available to the US or Russia. But there is no doubt that a world in
which US and Russian nuclear forces were counted in hundreds, rather than
thousands, would be one in which Britain would respond to the challenge of
multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms.’’121 In 2009, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office declared that, ‘‘We have made clear that when it will be useful
to include in any negotiations the small proportion of the world’s nuclear weapons
that belong to the UK, we will willingly do so.’’122
In 1983, French President François Mitterrand announced three conditions to be
satisfied before France could consider participating in nuclear arms control negotiations:
(1) the reduction of the superpower nuclear arsenals to levels much closer to those of the
other nuclear weapon states; (2) limitations on defensive systems capable of neutralizing
offensive deterrent forces (such as antimissile, antisubmarine, and antisatellite weaponry);
and (3) significant progress in the reduction of the conventional force imbalances in
Europe and the global elimination of chemical and biological weapons.123 The first
condition has remained most prominent in subsequent policy statements. François
Rivasseau, a French diplomat, stated in 2005 that if the ‘‘considerable imbalance’’ between
US and Russian strategic nuclear forces and those of France were modified through a
process of reductions, France ‘‘might envisage drawing the consequences from this.’’124
In discussions in June and July 2012, British and French observers agreed that US
and Russian decisions to pursue deep reductions in their nuclear forces could create
political pressure on the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France. US and Russian
reductions could make the UK and French forces look more significant and generate
demands for London and Paris to participate in multilateral nuclear arms reductions
negotiations. A French observer said that, ‘‘The sources of pressure might be the pacifists
and the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], but above all Moscow and Washington,
the disarming governments.’’125
A British observer said that a US initiative for deep reductions could lead to a
polarized debate, and that some Europeans would support France and the United
Kingdom not making further reductions in their nuclear forces. Some European observers
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said that France and the United Kingdom might respond to pressures to participate in
multilateral nuclear arms reductions negotiations by insisting that China and the non-P-5
nuclear weapon states also participate as a condition of their doing so.
The French in particular appear disposed to resist pressures to cut their nuclear
forces further and reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence. In 2010, Michel Miraillet, the
director of the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques in the Ministry of Defense (a post
equivalent to the US under secretary of defense for policy), wrote, ‘‘We can understand
that in a ‘second nuclear age’ certain powers will be in a position to further curb the role of
nuclear capabilities in their defense policy and to reduce their arsenals. But as for the role
of nuclear capabilities in its defense, France cannot follow the same path, and it will
maintain the foundations of its nuclear doctrine as it has publicly articulated them for
years.’’126
Some European observers have speculated that France and the United Kingdom
might prefer to make further unilateral reductions in their national nuclear forces instead
of participating in a multilateral negotiation and accepting treaty restrictions on their
forces. A British observer said, ‘‘If the cuts were taken on a national unilateral basis, there
would be no treaty obligation and the cuts would therefore be more readily reversible.
Furthermore, by doing it outside a treaty, there would be no verification mechanism
intruding in the United Kingdom.’’127
The assumption that avoiding a treaty obligation would allow for greater freedom of
action may be ill-founded in specific circumstances. On some occasions, non-parties to an
arms control treaty have behaved as if they were subject to its constraints. For example,
Mitterrand said in October 1988 that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
would not involve French forces, but he announced in May 1989 that the range of the
Hadès missile would be limited to less than 500 kilometers, since a range of 500 kilometers
or more would risk placing it within INF Treaty constraints in allied perceptions.128 The
George W. Bush administration made clear that it would not seek US ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but it also chose not to conduct any nuclear
explosive tests.
On some occasions, political statements have taken on the stature of treaty
commitments. As noted above, in December 1996, the North Atlantic Council declared
that ‘‘NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear
weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s
nuclear posture or nuclear policy*and we do not foresee any future need to do so.’’ This
‘‘three no’s’’ pledge was repeated in the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In October
1997, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen described the pledge as ‘‘a matter of NATO
policy, not a legal commitment.’’ He added that, ‘‘NATO will retain its existing much-
reduced, nuclear capabilities, and retain its right to modify its nuclear posture or policy
should circumstances warrant.’’129 Despite the accuracy of Cohen’s view that the ‘‘three
no’s’’ pledge is a statement of policy subject to modification, in practice it is widely
regarded as a formidable political obstacle to any proposals to deploy US nuclear forces on
the territory of new NATO allies or to make other significant changes in NATO’s nuclear
deterrence posture.
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These examples relate to the potential consequences for Britain and France of
possible US-Russian reductions to low numbers. Even if Russia and the United States made
such reductions on a semi-coordinated unilateral basis, rather than within a treaty
framework, the reductions might have political effects on Britain and France. Some NGOs
and governments might press London and Paris to make ‘‘no increase’’ commitments or
even to make reductions in their nuclear forces beyond those that they have already made
since the end of the Cold War. Political barriers to nuclear force modernization might
become apparent. The resulting political dynamics within NATO and the European Union
are open to debate.
Several European observers said in June and July 2012 that the organization of a
European Union nuclear deterrent based on the UK and French forces to compensate for
any decrease in the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence with a ‘‘low numbers’’
posture is implausible, owing above all to a lack of political will. They also noted the
financial obstacles to increasing UK and French capabilities to make up for US nuclear
force reductions; the absence of the solidarity necessary for collective defense; the
comparatively limited political weight of the United Kingdom and France on the world
scene; and the reservations regarding nuclear deterrence of Ireland and Sweden, among
other EU states.130
Possible Mechanisms for Managing Instability
Observers who see no risks of instability in a supposed ‘‘low numbers’’ situation have
logically perceived no need to consider what mechanisms might be employed to manage
instability. In contrast, observers in NATO states who consider the risks of instability in such
a situation significant have cited four possible measures*none of them panaceas*that
might help to contain such risks: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in
Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means
to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military
capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the extensive consultations with
the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such
important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture.
Two of these mechanisms could clearly be much more readily pursued at the higher
end of the ‘‘low numbers’’ spectrum (that is, 1,000 operationally deployed weapons) than
at the lower end (that is, 300 or fewer weapons). At the lower end, there would be much
less scope*if any*for retaining US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe and
maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture.
European observers concerned about the risks for alliance security in hypothetical
reductions to low numbers generally agreed on the imperative need for the United States
to retain nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft in Europe. Many expressed
uncertainty as to how to distinguish among the consequences of reductions to 1,000 or
500 or 300 or other ‘‘low numbers’’ levels of US nuclear weapons. Some referred simply to
general principles*for instance, the lower the numbers, the greater the reliance on ‘‘anti-
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cities’’ threats and the less the credibility of US extended deterrence. Another general
principle is that different weapon types may transmit distinct political messages.
Several European observers expressed incredulity about the possibility of reductions
to 1,000 US nuclear weapons. For example, a German said, ‘‘The idea of US reductions
to 1,000 nuclear weapons or fewer is incredible. I don’t think the US would ever do
that*never ever.’’131
Some European observers said, however, that they regarded a reduction to 1,000
nuclear warheads as the plausible minimal level for the United States, in view of its
worldwide extended deterrence responsibilities. A British observer said that the idea of the
United States reducing to 300 to 400 weapons is ‘‘scare-mongering,’’ and a French
observer said that a US reduction to 300 weapons would be ‘‘extreme’’ and not credible.132
Sustained Basing of US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Retaining US nuclear weapons in Europe in support of nuclear-sharing programs could
provide some assurance to NATO European allies as to the continuing commitment of the
United States to extended nuclear deterrence. One thousand or fewer US nuclear weapons
might, as noted above, degrade the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence
commitments by implying a US reliance on anti-cities threats. Allies and potential
adversaries might nonetheless view the enduring presence of US nuclear weapons in
Europe as an earnest US commitment that could provide effective deterrence.
This prescription implies that reciprocity with Russia should be sought with respect
to reductions in nonstrategic nuclear forces, and that US nuclear weapons in Europe
should not be completely withdrawn in the foreseeable future. In other words, a revised
allocation of US nuclear forces under an aggregate ceilings arrangement should retain a
number of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe.
The NATO allies have agreed on the general principle of reciprocity with Russia in
any further reductions in US nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. As stated
in the May 2012 DDPR:
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and
readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in
NATO strategy. Against this background and considering the broader security environ-
ment, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic
nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia,
taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons
stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Allies agree that the NAC [North Atlantic Council] will task the appropriate committees to
further consider, in the context of the broader security environment, what NATO would
expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant reductions
in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.133
While the allies have not yet, as indicated above, agreed on what specific ‘‘reciprocal
Russian actions’’ would ‘‘allow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic
nuclear weapons assigned to NATO,’’ they have kept open the option of retaining a
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number of US nuclear weapons in Europe. In each of the paragraphs above, the reference
to ‘‘the broader security environment’’ offers a subtle signal that the NATO allies recognize
the possible relevance of US nuclear weapons in Europe as an element of the alliance’s
deterrence and defense posture in relation to non-Russian contingencies.
This prescription also implies that the allies would avoid the pitfalls in what has
sometimes been termed a ‘‘reconstitution strategy.’’ Such a strategy would imply removing
all the remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe but maintaining in Europe storage vaults
for US nuclear weapons, US and allied dual-capable aircraft, and nuclear-certified air crews
and support personnel. The pitfalls in this strategy would include a loss of the alliance
solidarity inherent in the risk- and responsibility-sharing of basing US nuclear weapons in
Europe; a probable decrease in expertise, understanding, and support concerning alliance
nuclear policies in allied non-nuclear weapon states; and*most important*an abandon-
ment of the deterrence and crisis management options offered by maintaining US nuclear
forces in Europe available for combined air operations in an emergency.
Maintaining the US nuclear weapons in North America would mean that any move to
return them to Europe in a crisis might be opposed by some allied governments and publics as
likely to exacerbate the risks in the confrontation. A reconstitution approach would invite
problems that would not arise if US nuclear weapons were retained in Europe.134 Another
major disadvantage of a ‘‘reconstitution strategy’’ is that it would be of doubtful political
sustainability and would probably lead to terminating the alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrange-
ments. With no US nuclear weapons present in Europe, the United States and its NATO allies
would be less likely to continue to collectively train aircrews for potential combined alliance
nuclear operations or to maintain non-US nuclear-certified aircraft and nuclear weapon storage
vaults and support personnel in Europe.
Some European observers said that retaining US nuclear weapons in Europe would
be advantageous during a process of reductions to lower numbers. A French observer
suggested, for example, that, ‘‘Lower numbers might be accompanied by basing in Europe
for reassurance as well as deterrence.’’135 Similarly, a German stated, ‘‘To be safe, the allies
should keep nuclear-sharing in NATO*and US nuclear weapons in Europe*during a
process of reductions to low numbers.’’136 A Polish observer said:
If the US-Russian deal on nuclear weapons provides for freedom to mix [types of
weapons within an overall aggregate ceiling], the United States should absolutely keep
nuclear weapons in Europe. This is something we will pursue strongly. We are not able to
say at the moment what would be the safest low ‘red line’*how many would be
effective to deter any possibility of an attack, and therefore how many must be kept.
However, US nuclear weapons must remain in Europe. This is one of the basic strategic
assumptions. Most of the people in Poland will tell you that.137
Maintaining a Balanced US Strategic Nuclear Force Posture
European observers who commented on what US force structure might be appropriate if
the United States reduced to low numbers of nuclear weapons did not agree on whether
ICBMs should be retained, but consistently called for US retention of forward-deployable
dual-capable aircraft in addition to SSBNs. According to a British observer, ‘‘An SSBN-only
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force would imply Fortress America, with the message that allies should look to their own
interests. It would call NATO into question.’’ He said that the fact that the United Kingdom
has an SSBN-only force does not mean that such a force would suffice for US extended
deterrence in NATO:
To be brutally honest, the UK rationale depends on the continuing NATO context of US
extended deterrence. Operating independently, the UK nuclear force strengthens
difficulties in the mind of a potential aggressor. It’s not really based on a scenario of
Britain alone in the world. It’s a more subtle justification. What we have really makes
sense because it’s set in this context of US extended deterrence. The United Kingdom
would be very worried if US extended deterrence appeared to be weakening. If the US
relied solely on SSBNs, that would cause a very considerable anxiety in the UK as to
whether that would be seen as a credible means of extended deterrence in the NATO
context. The US needs multiple options, including DCA [dual-capable aircraft].138
Another British observer remarked, ‘‘Lowered holdings could be sufficient if they were
highly survivable*hence, privileging SSBNs and some air-launched capacity. This is the
model the French have gone for.’’139
With regard to US ICBMs, the same British observer asked, ‘‘Are hundreds of
Minuteman ICBMs necessary when they are targets?’’140 Some European observers
maintained that one of the essential functions of US ICBMs is precisely to serve as targets.
That is, without the US ICBMs, an opponent could substantially degrade US strategic
nuclear capabilities by attacking only a few targets*the two US SSBN bases and the three
strategic bomber bases.141 In other words, the US ICBM force contributes to strategic
stability by presenting many aim points and making a successful disarming enemy attack
much more difficult to envisage, much less undertake. Reductions in the US ICBM force’s
numbers could therefore diminish strategic stability. Moreover, in comparison with SSBNs
and bombers, ICBMs offer prompt strike options. According to a German observer, ‘‘If the
United States goes to lower numbers, the US nuclear force structure must include highly
survivable elements and must include options. It would not be a good idea to give up
ICBMs. The US should still maintain a diversity of options for credibility reasons.’’142
Another advantage to retaining ICBMs in the US force structure in a ‘‘low numbers’’
situation is that the marginal costs of attacking them would increase, given the reduced
number of Russian warheads. It is generally assumed that two or more warheads would
be required to have a high probability of eliminating an ICBM silo. Since the 2010 US
Nuclear Posture Review states that US ICBMs will have only one warhead, attacking them
would represent an unfavorable attack-result ratio for an attacker*expending two or
more warheads to eliminate just one US warhead.143 By retaining ICBMs, the United
States would raise the marginal costs for an adversary pursuing an effective disarming
strike. The US retention of ICBMs would therefore bolster strategic stability.
High-Readiness Means to Reconstitute US Nuclear Forces
Without referring specifically to US extended deterrence requirements in Europe or
elsewhere, Christopher Ford, a former special representative for nuclear nonproliferation
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in the State Department, has suggested that an important hedge for the maintenance of
strategic stability in a context of reductions to low numbers would be a rapid
reconstitution capability. In his view, the United States should ‘‘maintain a robust
infrastructure capable both of maintaining a viable, if smaller, force into the indefinite
future, and of quickly and reliably reconstituting a larger force if things go awry in the
strategic environment.’’144
The US government, in the 2010 NPR, made a comparable proposal for posturing
the United States for the risks that might arise with nuclear disarmament, including a
possible nuclear re-armament competition. Among ‘‘several important objectives toward
which the United States should direct future efforts,’’ the NPR argued that Washington
should:
Improve nuclear physical infrastructure and human capital to position the United States
to safely reduce nuclear weapons, and if international conditions allow, eliminate them
altogether. In a world where nuclear weapons had been eliminated but nuclear
knowledge remains, having a strong infrastructure and base of human capital would
be essential to deterring cheating or breakout, or, if deterrence failed, responding in a
timely fashion.145
Such a capability might help to reassure European allies concerned about the destabilizing
implications of any movement to low numbers. It is also possible, however, that some
European allied observers would see risks of instability in maintaining US and Russian
nuclear weapon complexes poised for a prompt reconstitution of forces reduced to low
numbers. The deeper the reductions to low numbers, the more the situation might
resemble that described by University of Maryland economist and professor Thomas
Schelling:
In summary, a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ would be a world in which the United
States, Russia, Israel, China, and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-
trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer
delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to preempt other nations’ nuclear
facilities, all in a high-alert status, with practice drills and secure emergency commu-
nications. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The
urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or
preempt. It would be a nervous world.146
Schelling’s vision might be overly optimistic in that it does not take into account the
possibility of asymmetries based on national objectives and idiosyncratic political and
strategic cultures. Some states might be more rigorous and ambitious than others in
maintaining reconstitution and mobilization capabilities, and/or more assiduous and
effective in concealing them. Moreover, the strategic assessments of some states might
lead them to maintain such capabilities with greater determination. For example, as long
as Moscow and Beijing view the United States as having substantial conventional military
superiority, they might well be more convinced than Washington of the need to maintain
and improve their nuclear reconstitution and mobilization capabilities, even in a context of
budgetary stringency and competing national priorities. The financial costs of maintaining
a nuclear weapon complex with fewer (or no) deployed nuclear weapons might lead
London and Paris to deepen the technical cooperation in nuclear matters envisaged in the
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November 2010 British-French Treaty signed at Lancaster House, but the political
sustainability of such a course might be open to debate.
If ‘‘former’’ nuclear weapon states*or states armed with low numbers of nuclear
arms*maintained robust reconstitution and mobilization capabilities at a high level of
readiness (as might be a high probability for at least some of them), the result might be a
situation less favorable to strategic stability than sustaining projected New START nuclear
force levels.
Analysts Avner Cohen and Joseph Pilat long ago noted that ‘‘virtual arsenals may
allow a state to contemplate greater risks in pursuing arms reductions,’’ but that such
arsenals would not solely present advantages: ‘‘Virtual weapons could offer some
important positive features*for example, less risk of accidental or unauthorized use*
and some negative, such as rising risks of rapid armament or rearmament.’’147 For a
Russian-US ‘‘low numbers’’ situation to be beneficial for strategic stability, some means
would have to be found to avoid the potential instabilities arising from an increased
dependence on a smaller nuclear force structure and high-readiness nuclear reconstitution
capabilities. The feasibility of devising those means has yet to be determined.
Enhanced US and Allied Non-Nuclear Military Capabilities
Enhanced non-nuclear capabilities, such as strategic missile defenses and projected
Prompt Global Strike assets, might, in the eyes of some observers, compensate partially for
the reductions in US nuclear forces to low numbers. However, non-nuclear capabilities*
including precision-strike long-range stealth drones and fuel-air explosives, among other
technologies*simply cannot substitute for nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons,
including their operational effects for some purposes (such as attacking hardened and
deeply buried targets), and the political and psychological potency of nuclear threats for
deterrence. As a demonstration of an existential commitment to the security of allies,
extended nuclear deterrence remains unmatched. The NATO allies agreed in May 2012
that, ‘‘Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it
cannot substitute for them.’’148 Many allied observers hold that the same principle applies
to conventional military forces.
Augmented US conventional military forces and expanded infrastructure, training,
and exercise programs for conventional military forces in support of NATO’s Article 5
(collective defense) commitments might nonetheless reinforce the alliance’s deterrence
posture and provide some assurance as to the genuineness of US engagement.
Pursuit of this hypothetical instability-management mechanism could be hindered
by tighter constraints on defense spending in most NATO nations, including the United
States, and by the fact that US military forces in Europe are being reduced in conjunction
with the US ‘‘pivot’’ to the Asia-Pacific. Compensatory US conventional force efforts*such
as periodic rotations of troops*would have to overcome concerns already stirred in some
quarters of NATO Europe by the January 2012 US announcement that the United States
will place greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. According to the defense guidance
document, ‘‘while the US military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of
necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.’’149 (Emphasis in original.)
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Russian policy and public diplomacy may also complicate the pursuit of improved
US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. Russian commentators have already
strongly criticized NATO’s strategic missile defense efforts, notably the US contribution
to these efforts (the recently scrapped European Phased Adaptive Approach), and the US
and allied efforts to enhance infrastructure, training, and exercise programs in support of
collective defense commitments to Central and Eastern European allied nations. According
to a recent Carnegie Endowment study, there is a risk that in some circumstances ‘‘Russian
responses to robust efforts at non-nuclear reassurance within the Alliance would probably
be not only diplomatic complaints but also arms buildups and the development of
compensatory unconventional threats, funded by increased hydrocarbon revenues that
have so transformed the country’s financial position.’’150
The Russian ‘‘unconventional threats’’ might well consist of nuclear forces, but
Russian biological weapons cannot be ruled out, given the great uncertainties about
Russian activities in this domain. An inability to compete in conventional military
capabilities has historically led states that deem themselves threatened to pursue
unconventional capabilities; and Russia, since the end of the Cold War, has followed
this established pattern.
Consultations About US Intentions and the Implications of Low Numbers
Consultations will no doubt remain an essential and continuing element of US alliance
relations in Europe and elsewhere. With regard to the pursuit of low numbers of US and
Russian nuclear weapons, NATO allies would probably welcome assurances that the US
approach to low numbers would be cautious, deliberate, incremental, and closely
coordinated with US allies.
The March 2010 speech by Italian President Giorgio Napolitano is noteworthy in this
regard. Napolitano said, ‘‘While deterrence still plays a fundamental role in preventing
nuclear wars, NATO should consider how to contribute to the nuclear-free world goal of
President Obama’s Prague speech. Small, well-thought, concrete and concerted steps can
go a long way in creating momentum toward the final goal.’’151 According to an Italian
observer, President Napolitano’s speech was prepared by the Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, and it expressed ‘‘the Italian preference for small and
carefully considered steps in the direction of nuclear disarmament.’’152
One of the fundamental questions to be addressed in consultations is why the
United States is examining options for reductions to low numbers. A French observer said
in July 2012 that, ‘‘It would be wiser to emphasize strategic stability instead of pushing for
deep reductions in nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.’’153 Another French
observer said that, ‘‘It is the increase in political stability and mutual confidence that could
someday lead to nuclear disarmament and not vice versa.’’154 A Polish observer developed
this argument as follows:
A US move to significantly lower numbers of nuclear weapons should be possible only in
radically changed political circumstances. These political circumstances should be the
driver*not an ideology of nuclear disarmament. Moving to low numbers without that
political change could be destabilizing.155
SPECIAL SECTION: STRATEGIC STABILITY IN EUROPE 235
Some European observers expressed uncertainty as to the US assumptions regarding
international politics that would favor reductions to low numbers. The concept of
reductions to low numbers takes an abstract view of international politics without
reference to concrete and specific security challenges. A French observer said in July 2012,
‘‘You need to go to Beijing. The problem of stability is not in Europe. The European nations
are for the most part like stowaways [passagers clandestins]. They are free-riders, including
the neutral countries like Austria and Switzerland.’’156
In other words, some European allied observers accept the US official view that
international power competition is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region, owing in large part
to the rise of China, but they discern a tension between the declared security goals of the
United States. The same January 2012 defense guidance that called for ‘‘a smaller nuclear
force’’ also prescribed a rebalancing of US military capabilities toward the Asia-Pacific. The
denuclearization agenda implies great-power cooperation and understanding, while the
rebalancing effort suggests greater attention to great-power competition. This is one of
the issues that the United States would have to address in consultations with its allies in
Europe and elsewhere with regard to the pursuit of a ‘‘low numbers’’ nuclear posture.
Conclusion: Prospects for Strategic Stability in Europe
The mechanisms discussed above probably could not compensate for the potentially
negative consequences for strategic stability and the credibility of US extended deterrence
of reductions to low numbers of US and Russian nuclear forces. This implies that the
pursuit of further US nuclear force reductions should be conducted with great care, with
due attention to the need to design convincing compensatory mechanisms, and with
extensive and continuing consultations among the NATO allies.
Some analysts appear to have exaggerated the ease with which US allies could be
reassured in a situation of dramatically reduced numbers. For example, Carnegie scholars
George Perkovich and James M. Acton have written that:
The US would only eliminate its last nuclear weapons at the same time as all other actors,
including China, eliminated theirs, with verification and enforcement provisions
negotiated to all states’ satisfaction. In this scenario, the nuclear threats against which
the US currently provides an umbrella nuclear deterrent would have been removed. The
US would presumably maintain its security commitments to allies and be prepared to
meet these commitments with conventional means.157
This observation is based on the historically disputable assumption that beneficiaries
of US extended deterrence have relied on US protection solely to counter ‘‘nuclear
threats,’’ when in fact the NATO allies during the Cold War and subsequently have relied
on US extended deterrence to prevent aggression or coercion in any form. During the Cold
War, it should be recalled, the United States and its NATO allies regarded nuclear weapons
as essential elements of a posture intended to deter Soviet aggression with nuclear,
conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons.158 Another debatable proposition is
that US preparedness ‘‘to meet these commitments with conventional means’’ would
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suffice to assure allies that have witnessed the failure of conventional deterrence measures
in the past.
Low numbers of US and Russian nuclear weapons could affect strategic stability in
Europe in fundamental ways, owing in part to the assessments of the implications that
might be made in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and many other capitals. The
key factors shaping strategic stability are ultimately political; and this includes allied
confidence in the United States as a reliable and responsible security guarantor capable of
deterring aggression or coercion and, if necessary, taking action with its NATO allies to
restore the security and integrity of the NATO area. There is an obvious interdependence
between that confidence and assessments of US and allied capabilities and options for
crisis management, effective deterrence and war-prevention, and (if necessary) operations.
The challenges in maintaining US and allied confidence in NATO’s deterrence and defense
posture could be much greater in a situation of low numbers than with the negotiated
New START levels.
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